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 Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) during the First and Second World Wars featured a relentless struggle of measure versus countermeasure as op-
posing forces sought a decisive edge. Examples abound from both world wars: 
unrestricted submarine warfare bred convoys; surface attacks by submarines 
spawned Q-ships; hull-mounted sonar triggered night surface attacks by U-boats; 
the so-called Black Pit in the North Atlantic demanded very-long-range (VLR) 
patrol aircraft; acoustic homing torpedoes begot towed decoy noisemakers; and 
so forth. Some measures required immediate response, while others induced 
more-subtle reactions; some required strategic adjustments, while others could 
be met by innovative tactics.
The measure-countermeasure pattern continued into Cold War ASW, dur-
ing which improvements to the performance, 
sensors, and weaponry of submarines forced 
bold counterstrokes. One of the most significant 
challenges to Allied antisubmarine (A/S) forces 
during this so-called Third Battle arose in the 
mid-1950s with the receipt of intelligence that 
the Soviets were developing the capability to 
launch nuclear-armed missiles from convention-
al submarines. In 1956, the U.S. Navy’s Project 
Nobska—a group of scientists, academics, and 
naval personnel tasked with investigating trends 
in ASW—explained the problem as follows: 
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“Confronted with quiet submarines of long endurance, a sufficiently accurate 
means of navigation, and suitable weapons, a defense against shore bombard-
ment by submarines becomes a huge problem. Even the partial defense of a 
long coastline requires a very large effort.”1 
The U.S. Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) arguably were the Al-
lied navies that the missile threat impacted most. During the first years of the 
Cold War, the Atlantic Ocean had provided a moatlike buffer against maritime 
nuclear threats. Soviet strategic bombers could reach North America, but direct 
nuclear attack from the sea was thought to be beyond the Soviets’ capability. That 
changed when naval intelligence organizations forecast that the Soviets would 
have the capability to deploy missile-firing submarines (SSGs) within range of 
North American targets as soon as the late 1950s.2 The prospect of enemy missile 
boats lurking within range of American and Canadian defense installations and 
population centers—a Cold War PAUKENSCHLAG, or Барабанный Бой, if you 
will—alarmed naval planners.3 Particularly troubling would be attacks on the 
bases and command centers of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which was 
charged with delivering a nuclear response.
SSGs were a game changer, and planners and operators scrambled to de-
velop countermeasures. In the spring of 1955, the RCN’s initial response was 
enunciated in the only recently declassified Seaward Defence Report. Described 
by one officer as a “new look” at the maritime threat confronting Canada, the 
study concluded that then-emerging sound-surveillance systems were the key 
to countering SSGs, and it enunciated the types of forces that should be used to 
supplement the systems and how they should be employed.4 In short, the Sea-
ward Defence Report provided a blueprint for how to conduct seaward defense 
in the nuclear age.
The report is an invaluable historical tool. It reveals how a midsize navy with 
comparatively limited resources charged with defending a long coastline and 
valuable strategic targets proposed to cope with dramatically changing circum-
stances. It also shows what Canadian naval planners understood about the nature 
of the Soviet threat in the mid-1950s, as well as their ability to counter it, at the 
moment they confronted the challenge. And it demonstrates how they sought to 
use these circumstances to further their ambitions. Importantly, the report also 
allows a peek at probable American thinking, since the almost seamless coopera-
tion that then existed between the RCN and the U.S. Navy suggests that their 
plans may have been similar. Finally, examination of follow-on exercises allows 
testing of the report’s hypothesis. The Seaward Defence Report, then, presents an 
intriguing case study of how Cold War naval planners adapted to Soviet offensive 
innovations in the maritime sphere.
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THE HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC CONTEXT
In the mid-1950s, Canadian planning revolved around overlapping maritime 
defense partnerships in the North Atlantic. (While the Pacific was not ignored, 
the North Atlantic dominated thinking.) Since Canada was a founding member 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the RCN had obligations to 
the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), including responsibility 
for the Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area (CANLANT). The SACLANT commitment 
was a cornerstone of RCN planning.
However, this relationship was matched, and occasionally overshadowed, by 
Canada’s close defense partnership with the United States. Since the 1940 Og-
densburg Agreement, Canada and the United States had cemented their military 
cooperation through vehicles such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defense and 
the Military Cooperation Committee. The relationship was not allowed to wither 
after the war, and in February 1947 the two countries announced their intention 
to continue with joint cooperation for continental defense. Demonstrating the 
intimacy of the partnership, that August the RCN’s Director of Naval Plans noted 
that “in view of the vital importance of the defense of North American war mak-
ing ability in a future war, RCN planning will in future be largely based on the 
Naval forces now envisaged in the [U.S./Canada] Basic Security Plan. This will 
make desirable the standardization of the RCN and the USN by the time that the 
Basic Security Plan must be ready for immediate implementation.”5 
The creation of NATO in April 1949 led to the establishment of the Canada-
U.S. Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG), which functioned in part as a liai-
son between the two North American navies and other NATO forces under 
SACLANT. Importantly, although CUSRPG was part of NATO, for security 
reasons the United States and Canada often were unwilling to share the details 
of continental defense with European allies, in particular regarding information 
about sound-surveillance systems.6 Beyond these relationships, the RCN pre-
served its umbilical cord with the Royal Navy (RN), although the U.S. Navy was 
emerging as Canada’s predominant maritime partner.
In the mid-1950s, the RCN was in the early stages of a substantial modern-
ization of its A/S assets. The destroyers and frigates that formed the backbone 
of the postwar fleet were British designs of Second World War vintage.7 De-
stroyer strength consisted of seven Tribal-class and two each of the Valentine- and 
Crescent-class intermediate designs; two of the latter had their A/S capability 
significantly enhanced through a conversion similar to the Royal Navy’s Type 
15 program, while another seven underwent the more limited Type 16 upgrade.8 
Sixteen River-class frigates were scheduled to undergo the Prestonian conversion, 
which, like the destroyer modernization, provided significant upgrades to their 
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sonar, radar, weaponry, and other systems. The RCN’s lone aircraft carrier, the 
light fleet carrier (CVL) Magnificent, also was of Second World War design, as 
were its Grumman A/S-3 Avenger and Hawker FB-11 Sea Fury aircraft. These 
ships and aircraft could prosecute moderately fast submarines but were challenged 
by improved types with performance similar to those undergoing the U.S. Navy’s 
new Greater Underwater Propulsion Power Program (i.e., GUPPY) conversions.9 
However, enhanced capability was on the horizon. As part of the increase in 
defense spending that came with the escalation of the Cold War in the late 1940s, 
the RCN was building seven St. Laurent–class destroyer escorts, with seven simi-
lar Restigouche-class ships to follow. Scheduled to begin commissioning in 1955, 
these ships ultimately would be considered among the finest A/S platforms in the 
world. The new destroyers were to be accompanied by ships of the recently ap-
proved Vancouver-class frigate program, which was intended to provide replace-
ments for the Prestonians as oceangoing escorts. In addition, the significantly 
modernized CVL HMCS Bonaventure, equipped with advanced angled-deck, 
mirror-landing, and steam-catapult systems, was due to commission in 1956, 
with an air group composed of Grumman CS2F Tracker A/S aircraft and McDon-
nell F2H-3 Banshee fighters.10 Strides also were being made in the development 
of ASW helicopters. Submarine strength was limited to two A-class boats on loan 
from Britain’s Royal Navy. The fleet was rounded out by the light cruisers Ontario 
and Québec, which were used as training ships and designated for reserve if war 
broke out, as well as a cadre of minesweepers. Although the fleet possessed the 
elements of a balanced capability, ASW was the RCN’s primary focus, and the 
planners mulling over new concepts in naval warfare in the spring of 1955 did 
so with the confidence that they were working from the basis of an increasingly 
effective A/S component.11 
Under the SACLANT war plans in place in the mid-1950s, if conflict erupted 
Canada’s most potent A/S assets would be deployed immediately away from 
home waters to the eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT) under the NATO strategy 
emphasizing support to Europe. The aircraft carrier and fifteen escorts would 
head overseas to form the nucleus of a joint RCN/RN A/S hunting group 
based in Brest, France. The remaining oceangoing escorts were committed to 
the protection of the transatlantic shipping that would reinforce Europe. Only 
minesweepers would be allocated to Canadian waters, with the Algerine class 
escorting coastal convoys while the smaller Bangor and Bay classes fulfilled local 
minesweeping tasks.12 
Although the Canadian government recognized that circumstances might 
preclude the deployment of the core of its A/S strength overseas, the European 
commitment remained paramount. But the new notions associated with seaward 
defense would challenge that policy.
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THE SEAWARD DEFENCE REPORT
The Seaward Defence Report originated from a December 1954 request from the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee that the navy investigate “the nature and extent” of 
Canada’s seaward defenses at various stages of a war at sea. The focus was to be 
on the period 1958–62 and, reflecting NATO’s conception of a two-stage war—
opening with a thirty-day nuclear exchange, followed by a period of conventional 
warfare—it was to examine requirements “on M-day, M plus 30 days, and after 
M plus 30 days.”13 
This spawned the Seaward Defence Committee, composed of the senior of-
ficers at the head of the warfare and planning branches at Naval Service Head-
quarters (NSHQ) in Ottawa. The Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (ACNS) (Plans), 
Commodore D. L. Raymond, led the group, with the ACNSs (Warfare) and (Air), 
Commodores Kenneth L. Dyer and W. L. M. Brown, respectively, and the Direc-
tor of Naval Plans and Operations (DNPO), Captain William M. Landymore, 
the other members. A working group chaired by Landymore, with officers from 
NSHQ’s antisubmarine, aviation, communications, and navigation directorates, 
did the spadework preparing the numerous specialized studies that formed the 
backbone of the report.14 
Taking four months to complete, the study ultimately spanned some two hun-
dred pages, including twenty-eight papers and thirteen annexes. Tight security 
shrouded the report, which was protected on a strict need-to-know basis owing 
to the “special security regulations” that protected information pertaining to 
sound-surveillance systems.15 
THE CONCEPT
The “new look” was driven by the nature of the threat that would confront the 
RCN at the end of the decade. On the basis of shared intelligence, including “cur-
rent American Canadian Agreed Intelligence papers,” it was acknowledged that 
in the 1958–62 time frame the Soviets would have the capability to attack the 
Canadian coast with aircraft, surface forces, and submarines.16 The report graded 
these threats from “improbable” to “probable,” as follows:
 (a) The following forms of attack are considered improbable:
  (i) Attack by surface forces, by virtue of almost certain prospect of detection 
and destruction
  (ii) Attack by air on maritime targets other than major ports, due to there being 
other targets of greater strategic importance
  (iii) Attack inside local defenses by oceangoing submarines, due to the greater 
risk of detection
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 (b) The following forms of attack are considered possible:
  (i) Commando-style attacks launched from submarines outside local defenses
  (ii) Attacks by small battle units launched from submarines outside local  
defenses
  (iii) Minelaying by clandestine means in approaches to defended areas
 (c) The following forms of attack are considered probable:
  (i) Torpedo attacks from submarines on coastal convoys, in focal areas or on 
coastal routes
  (ii) Minelaying from submarines on coastal shipping routes in focal areas and 
harbor approaches
  (iii) Minelaying from submarines in approaches to defended areas
  (iv) Missile attacks launched from submarines
  (v) Air attacks on the major ports17
With the exception of missile attacks by submarines and air attacks on 
major ports, these threats fell within the bounds of the traditional and were 
almost identical to assessments made during the Second World War. Giving 
priority to the probable threats and acknowledging the primary responsibility 
of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) for air defense, the Seaward Defence 
Report zeroed in on the submarine threat.18 It enumerated three main naval 
tasks:
 (i) To deny enemy submarines access to waters from which they can effectively 
launch guided missiles
 (ii) To provide protection to shipping within the Canadian coastal areas against 
submarine attack
 (iii) To provide protection to Canadian harbors and approach channels against pen-
etration and all forms of attack from enemy submarines19
Given the gravity of the threat, the report was concerned mainly with missile-
firing submarines. The RCN estimated that by 1960 the Soviets would be capable 
of deploying eight long-range submarines to the Atlantic coast and six to the 
Pacific coast, and they accepted British intelligence that the “Z” or Zulu-class 
long-range boats would be capable of launching missiles. On this basis they 
determined that the “most recent estimate available of the capability during the 
period under review is that submarines will be able to launch a missile a distance 
of 500 miles and that they will be able to control over 200 miles. A second sub-
marine operating in conjunction with the launching submarine could increase 
the controlled range to 400 miles.”20 
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Interestingly, even though USS Nautilus’s initial exploits were well known, 
the report made no reference to nuclear-powered submarines and the immense 
capability they might bring to strategic or A/S roles.21 Regarding the missiles 
SSGs would carry, intelligence sources concluded that the Soviets “had available 
an improved V-1 type with a high explosive warhead” and “a larger twin pulse 
Jet V-1 type.” Moreover, it was understood that the Soviet Union “had reached a 
point in weapon technology at which it was capable of producing a wide variety 
of weapon types and nuclear weapons for weapons other than bombs.”22 The threat 
from the sea was serious: “The improved range, speed, and accuracy of the sub-
sonic pilotless aircraft, which could be ready for mass production in 1955, would 
greatly increase the number of good targets for submarine-launched attack. In 
about 1958 the estimated nuclear warhead yield will approach compatibility with 
the estimated accuracy of the weapon system and would greatly increase the like-
lihood of its use against such targets as air bases and coastal port facilities.”23 With 
the possible exception of the number of boats the Soviets would be able to deploy 
to North American coasts by 1960, these estimates proved accurate.24 
COURSES OF ACTION
So, what to do? The challenge for A/S forces was driven by the necessity to destroy 
SSGs before they launched their missiles; the value of dispatching them afterward 
paled in significance. The hunt was made more difficult because A/S forces were 
seeking individual, free-ranging submarines that were attempting to evade detec-
tion, instead of ones lying in wait for convoys or patrolling established shipping 
lanes—there would be no “flaming datum” of the traditional variety.25 Complicat-
ing the problem was that since the Canadian seaward-defense zone now would 
extend to the range of sound-surveillance systems (i.e., hundreds of miles out to 
sea) the area to be defended would expand by thousands of square miles—and 
this in the notoriously poor oceanographic conditions of the Canadian northwest 
Atlantic. The conventional solution would be to use carrier hunter-killer (HUK) 
groups or long-range maritime-patrol aircraft (MPA)—conventional submarines 
dedicated to ASW (designated SSKs) were just coming into their own—but 
without the advantage of intelligence like that provided by direction finding and 
ULTRA during the Battle of the Atlantic the task of finding individual submarines 
in the vast, open ocean would be difficult indeed.26 
For Canada’s senior naval planners, the solution to this complex A/S problem 
lay with pioneering sound-surveillance systems. These, it was thought, would 
“give the earliest possible warning of impending attack” and “enable our forces 
to locate and destroy the attackers.”27 Although the systems were still in the early 
stages of development, Canadians had familiarity with them through informa-
tional exchange agreements with both the Americans and the British. Moreover, 
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in November 1952 the U.S. State Department had approached Canada for per-
mission to site a surveillance station on Sable Island off Nova Scotia to fill a gap 
in the planned network along the Atlantic seaboard. After initial surveys revealed 
Sable Island to be unsuitable, the two countries agreed to build a facility at Shel-
burne on Nova Scotia’s south coast.28 
A high-level report described what became known as Station Fox: “The Sound 
Research Station at Shelburne is planned to consist of an array of special devices 
laid on the ocean floor in 1,000 fathoms of water, approximately 100 miles at 
sea, with a tail cable laid from the array to Shelburne, where the equipment and 
personnel would be housed. In addition to the deep water array, a shallow water 
array is being laid for the purpose of research into the conditions met in cold, 
shallow waters peculiar to the Canadian coastal areas.”29 
Embracing the promise the technology represented, RCN planners made it the 
foundation of the philosophy espoused in the Seaward Defence Report. The new 
seaward-defense concept envisioned a combination of two sound-surveillance 
systems. Under the designations then used by Canadian naval planners, these 
were the LOFAR (for low-frequency analysis and recording) system, developed 
by the Americans, and the CORSAIR (for co-relation of sound analysis and 
recording) system under initial investigation in the United Kingdom.30 The 
LOFAR system enabled the detection of submarines through the capture of 
low-frequency acoustics by arrays of hydrophones extending far out to sea on 
the ocean floor. The arrays were connected to naval shore facilities where the 
acoustic data were analyzed digitally, with any resultant target data passed to 
operational headquarters for prosecution. In 1950, personnel involved with the 
U.S. Navy’s Project HARTWELL, which was investigating the viability of a long-
range acoustic detection system, recommended the detection of submarines by 
using real-time spectral analysis of radiated sound energy as holding the most 
promise for a future A/S detection system. That November, the Western Electric 
Company was contracted to develop the technology; it assigned the work to its 
research organization at Bell Telephone Laboratories. Work proceeded quickly 
and the first operational evaluation began in April 1952, with a forty-hydrophone 
array installed in two hundred fathoms from Eleuthera in the Bahamas. The test 
proved so successful that the U.S. Navy immediately called for the establishment 
of a nine-station chain along the eastern coast of the United States, including the 
future Station Fox.31 
The British CORSAIR system was more of an unknown. The Admiralty 
Research Laboratory had begun to work it up only in 1952 and oceanographic 
evaluation still was under way, so the Seaward Defence Report acknowledged 
that it was in “its very earliest stages for which no evaluation information is 
available.”32 
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The Seaward Defence Report explained the differences between the two sys-
tems. The LOFAR system was “a network of surveillance stations strategically 
sited over the ocean approaches to the Coast,” built to form “a surveillance belt 
which will detect and locate snorkeling submarines and thereby assist the ASW 
forces in the protection of coastal shipping and defense against submarines ca-
pable of launching attack weapons against the mainland.” Spread evenly along 
the coast, the stations of the network would form “a surveillance belt about 500 
miles to seaward.” Performance would be affected by many variables, including 
oceanography and the topography of the ocean floor; however, “ranges against 
snorting submarines up to 500 miles may be experienced under favorable con-
ditions on some bearings while on others it might not exceed 150 miles.”33 The 
systems would produce the best results against snorkeling boats; “[s]hould the 
submarine be on the surface or proceeding [submerged] on main motors, the 
detection capability is drastically reduced.” CORSAIR, on the other hand, “has 
been developed to determine the accurate location of submarines in compara-
tively shallow waters off the North Western European continental shelf by means 
of hydrophones connected to a shore station.” Expected ranges were far less than 
for LOFAR; preliminary evaluation indicated that “a submarine may be detected 
snorting out to ranges of 50 miles” and “a submerged submarine doing 4 knots on 
motors has been detected up to ranges of 10 miles.” Bearing accuracy would be 
superior; however, unlike LOFAR, which could identify individual submarines by 
their unique “signatures,” CORSAIR would be unable to provide specific target-
classification information.34 
The report concluded that one system could backstop the other. The authors 
envisioned an overlapping network of LOFAR and CORSAIR installations.
With LOFAR, the U.S. Navy proposed siting stations two hundred miles apart 
to cover the required area and provide a degree of overlap to enable cross bearings 
to be obtained for contacts. Following that model—the only one in existence, after 
all—and taking “known conditions” into account, the Canadian report projected a 
network of five LOFAR arrays on the Atlantic coast, to be located off Sable Island; 
the southern and eastern extremities of the Grand Banks; Bonavista Bay, New-
foundland; and Hamilton Inlet, Labrador (see map 1). Some of these requirements 
already had been addressed: Station Fox at Shelburne covered the area seaward of 
Sable Island, and the RCN was aware of U.S. plans to site a shallow-water station 
at Argentia, Newfoundland, to cover the southern Grand Banks. The three arrays 
required on the Pacific coast would be located off Cape Cook at the northwest 
extremity of Vancouver Island and at Cape Saint James and Cape Knox at the 
southern and northern points of the Queen Charlotte Islands (see map 2).35 
Shallow-water CORSAIR arrays would provide “a ‘road block’ inside the cov-
erage obtained by the long range LOFAR system.”36 The report did not specify 
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the number of CORSAIR stations required, but the accompanying charts gave a 
theoretical projection of as many as fifteen arrays on the east coast and five on the 
west. These would monitor the approaches to the Strait of Belle Isle, the Strait of 
Canso, and the Bay of Fundy on the Atlantic coast, and Dixon Entrance, Queen 
Charlotte Sound, and the Strait of Juan de Fuca on the Pacific.37 
Although the planners went “all in” on sound surveillance, they did not neglect 
the need for other detection technologies. In particular, since they presumed that 
Soviet submarine commanders would have to communicate with their headquarters 
before launching a missile attack, reliable direction-finding and electronic counter-
measures (ECM) capabilities would be essential. Nonetheless, the LOFAR/COR-
SAIR combination would constitute the primary trip wire, and it promised to “pro-
vide the necessary warning to cover the seaward approaches to our coastal areas.”38 
FORCE REQUIREMENTS
The Seaward Defence Report considered in great detail the nature of forces re-
quired to intercept SSGs using the information provided by sound surveillance. 
The situation confronting the planners was unprecedented; although the RCN 
had plenty of experience hunting submarines off the Atlantic coast in both world 
wars, never before had it faced a threat as grave as the missile-firing submarine.
The large arcs represent LOFAR coverage; the small circles depict CORSAIR coverage.
Source: CNS, “Underwater Surveillance Requirements.”
MAP 1 
THE PROPOSED EAST COAST SOUND-SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 4, Art. 8
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss4/8
 1 2 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
Consequently, the report’s authors understood that to avoid a catastrophic 
nuclear scenario, A/S forces required the capability to prosecute any contact 
swiftly. This placed a reliance on “offensive support” to the sound-surveillance 
system. The report explained it this way: The nature of the threat, coupled with 
the long-range detection capability of LOFAR, defined the characteristics re-
quired in offensive supporting units. These were as follows:
 (i) Ability to locate the submarine as near as possible to the point of first detection
 (ii) Ability to attack and destroy the submarine, with the smallest possible time delay, 
by day or night, in any weather
 (iii) Ability to patrol continuously the outer limits of the detection arc39
Mobility was key, requiring forces to have the ability “to locate, hold, attack, 
and destroy the submarine”—quickly. The RCAF’s MPAs would form the back-
bone of the system, and they would require “all weather and long endurance 
qualities.”40 Here, Canada was in good shape. The majority of the RCAF’s maritime- 
patrol squadrons were equipped with the Lockheed P2V-7 Neptune, which the 
report suggested “would provide the best type for the roles envisaged.”41 But the 
Source: CNS, “Underwater Surveillance Requirements.”
MAP 2 
PROPOSED WEST COAST SOUND-SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM 
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Neptunes were only a temporary stand-in until the VLR Canadair CL-28 Argus, 
arguably the most effective MPA of its generation, entered service in 1957. When 
the Arguses became operational, naval CS2F Trackers would supplement the 
RCAF effort by flying inshore patrols from shore bases or the carrier.42 
Despite its substantial capability, the air umbrella required seagoing support. 
The Second World War experience had shown that aircrews found it nearly im-
possible to confirm the results of attacks on submerged submarines, and the re-
port concluded that since “the final destruction of the [missile-firing] submarine 
must be assured, in this task both aircraft and ships are required.” The authors 
determined that the ship designated for seaward defense “must be capable of 
high speed (say 30 knots), it must have long endurance at medium speeds, and it 
must be designed primarily to operate effectively under North Atlantic weather 
conditions.” Other desired features included superior sea-keeping qualities; the 
ability to operate sonar at high tactical speed; gun armament capable of destroy-
ing submarines and providing antiaircraft defense; effective A/S weaponry; radar 
and communications systems able to control helicopters and provide long-range 
air warning; and, because of the expected long duration of patrols, a high level of 
comfort and habitability.43 
The Second World War–era destroyers that then formed the most potent 
element of the RCN’s A/S force had the speed and punch required, but lacked 
endurance. The River-class frigates, Bangor- and Algerine-class minesweepers, 
and Bird-class patrol boats that formed the remainder of the force were deemed 
wholly inadequate. The report’s authors thought the RCN had the solution in 
hand in the form of the new escorts about to join the fleet: “The destroyer of St. 
Laurent type with speed, sea-keeping qualities, if provided with an adequate gun 
armament, would most nearly meet the envisaged operational requirement.”44 
How would this combination of air and surface forces, cued by sound surveil-
lance, locate and destroy missile boats? At the time it was thought that, to launch 
its missiles, a submarine would have to surface for little more than three minutes; 
however, the estimated duration grew over time.45 Given current assessments of 
battery capacity, it was estimated that a submerged submarine would be able to 
penetrate about 175 miles into the three-hundred-mile LOFAR detection zone 
before it had to expose itself to detection from sound surveillance by snorkel-
ing. From that point, “a submarine would be required to transit the remaining 
55 miles to an optimal firing position at snorkeling depth or on the surface. At a 
snorting speed of 10 knots, time of transit would be approximately 5½ hours.”46
Owing to the probability that submarines would be vulnerable only once 
they were well within the detection zone, a “perimeter type patrol” was deemed 
unsuitable; instead surface forces should be positioned within the LOFAR zone. 
Patrol areas for fixed-wing aircraft could be more variable and reserve aircraft 
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could be held in readiness at their airfields. In terms of numbers, it was thought 
that a “four ship support force for each LOFAR installation provides an efficient 
unit,” which meant a force of twenty-four dedicated surface vessels on the east 
coast and twelve on the west coast, for a total of thirty-six St. Laurents. For fixed-
wing aircraft, the minimum number required for the east coast was calculated to 
be six on patrol and six at readiness, with half those numbers in the Pacific. These 
numbers increased dramatically when maintenance and training requirements 
were taken into account.47 
Although mainly concerned with countering missile boats, the Seaward 
Defence Report touched on tangential aspects of navy policy and operations. 
Perhaps most importantly, although it did not question sacrosanct SACLANT 
plans, the threat from missile boats raised the possibility that Canada might have 
to reconsider sending the bulk of its A/S forces overseas to EASTLANT at the 
outset of any conflict. The report also considered the implications of the U.S. 
Navy / Air Force Lamplight study into requirements for the continental air de-
fense of North America. The report noted that some of the warning systems the 
American study recommended would complement the seaward-defense plan, 
and suggested that RCN escorts could contribute as air-defense picket ships, 
“both by providing information to the system and by acting offensively on the 
information provided by it.” This meant the ships would require sophisticated 
air-defense capability.48 
Communications, command-and-control organization, base requirements, 
and other vital factors also received consideration. In terms of sustaining seago-
ing forces, the RCN possessed only limited underway-replenishment capability 
and no fast oilers; however, the committee thought this unnecessary for warships 
operating in the LOFAR zone—which would seem to fly in the face of its stated 
requirement for the ships to have long endurance.49 On the other hand, the com-
mittee recognized that A/S helicopters could play a critical role, either attacking 
contacts located closer inshore or operating from a dedicated carrier.50 
Mine clearance received considerable attention. Recent experience in the Ko-
rean War and ongoing intelligence emphasized the Soviets’ strong commitment 
to mine warfare and their use of moored, ground, and drifting mines with varied 
firing mechanisms, including contact and influence (magnetic, acoustic, and 
pressure), combined with various delayed fuses. In view of this threat, the com-
mittee recommended that the “main ports” of Halifax, Sydney, and Esquimalt/
Victoria be kept open at all times, with forces available to clear “lesser ports” 
within forty-eight hours.51 
In terms of the traditional static components of seaward defense, the report 
questioned whether there was any further need for coastal-artillery batteries 
and suggested that net defenses could be reduced. The authors thought that 
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controlled minefields and indicator loops still had utility, but the need for them 
could be reconsidered once the sound-surveillance system was developed.52 In 
terms of coastal convoys, the report suggested they would not be required on 
Canada’s west coast but “will be required on the East Coast unless long range 
detection devices with adequate supporting forces can be developed.”53 In many 
areas, therefore, the potential of the new sound-surveillance system promised a 
transformation in seaward defense.
THE SHORTCOMINGS
Notwithstanding the presentation of a realistic concept to counter missile-firing 
submarines, the Seaward Defence Report suffered a number of shortcomings. 
Some of these can be attributed to patchy intelligence or a lack of concrete in-
formation about the actual capability of sound-surveillance systems, but others 
stemmed from oversights or flawed thinking. In his cover letter, the Chief of the 
Naval Staff (CNS), Vice Admiral E. Rollo Mainguy, explained that the report took 
no account of the costs or personnel implications associated with the concept.54 
Despite this, the authors stated some specific requirements, such as additional 
surveillance arrays, and the precise numbers needed to bring air and seagoing 
forces up to the proposed strength. Naval leaders also used the report’s findings 
as a rationale for procuring additional St. Laurents. Consequently, the lines were 
blurred on whether the plan was a conceptual think piece or a road map to a 
specific objective.
Certain operational factors also were not taken into account. There was no 
statement regarding when the forces providing offensive support to the sound-
surveillance system would be deployed. Would they be on constant patrol as 
a deterrent, or deploy only in an emergency? That, of course, would affect the 
numbers of ships and aircraft required, but also would depend on Soviet capa-
bilities. Would the Soviets mount standing patrols in peacetime or only surge 
into missile-firing positions just before or at the outbreak of any conflict, thus 
likely providing a degree of warning? As mentioned previously, the report also 
surprisingly made no mention of the possibility of the Soviets adopting nuclear 
propulsion; if they could mate nuclear warheads with missiles, surely they could 
do the same with nuclear propulsion and submarines. By ignoring such issues, 
the report lost an element of rationality. As will be seen, senior defense officials 
did take these factors, and others, into account.
There was subtext to the Seaward Defence Report, which may help to explain 
its deficiencies. Since its establishment in 1910, the RCN had struggled to thrive 
in the face of government and public indifference. With budgets tightening with 
the end of the Korean conflict, the report offered an opportunity to allay the 
impact of cuts on the navy. Continental air defense was a primary reason the 
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RCAF captured a major portion of the defense budget. By inserting a maritime 
component into the continental-air-defense equation in the form of the missile-
firing submarine, naval leaders hoped to obtain a greater share of the financial 
pot. In his cover letter to the report, Admiral Mainguy emphasized that vital 
targets within the range of SSGs “may be in just as much danger from thermo-
nuclear attack delivered by submarine as from the same attack delivered by 
aircraft.”55 Surely, when the specter of nuclear war lay at the forefront of defense 
considerations and was very much in the public eye, the government could not 
ignore the threat of nuclear attack from the sea? Naval leaders clearly hoped that 
their seaward-defense concept would enable them to take advantage of a real and 
substantial national concern and affirm the navy’s increased relevance to conti-
nental defense. It also presented an opportunity to upgrade the fleet. Although 
the recently approved Vancouver-class frigate program promised to deliver a 
useful oceangoing escort, the senior staff had become concerned by its limited 
performance and lack of general-purpose capability. The Seaward Defence Report 
made the case for replacing the Vancouvers with additional St. Laurents, which 
would strengthen the fleet.
Although the report’s authors did not express these ambitions directly, they 
clearly were in play. Given the chronic uncertainty that had shrouded much of the 
RCN’s history, it is hard to blame the authors for playing these cards.56 
THE U.S. NAVY’S APPROACH
The U.S. Navy also grappled with the SSG threat. An attack-at-source approach 
by carrier strike forces against Soviet submarine bases and the use of HUKs on 
barrier patrols were key elements of its existing ASW plans; however, like the 
RCN, the U.S. Navy envisioned sound-surveillance systems as “the most prom-
ising solution” to SSGs. As a December 1954 report to the Chief of Naval Op-
erations (CNO) from the Anti-Submarine Plans and Policies Group explained, 
HUKs “were not created to search wide areas of ocean in the hopes of discovering 
an enemy submarine.” “It is our earnest hope,” the report continued, “that the 
LOFAR stations which form our Sound Surveillance System in the Atlantic and 
Pacific will furnish us with the necessary operational intelligence and will give 
us the advance warning that we need to meet the threat of a mass nuclear guided 
missile attack launched from submarines.”57 
The report referenced exercises using MPA/destroyer teams to chase down 
contacts detected by sound surveillance, while carrier HUK groups patrolled 
beyond the range of the detection system farther out to sea.58 Although it is not 
known whether the two allies consulted one another at this early stage of the SSG 
problem—it seems likely that they did, given the cooperation over Station Fox 
and other matters—the concept showed that USN thinking paralleled that of the 
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RCN; the main difference was that the RCN was prepared to position its carrier 
group inside the LOFAR detection zone. Beyond this overall tactical harmony, 
the United States, like Canada, was shifting more of its A/S focus from overseas 
to home waters in response to the SSG threat; in October 1955, a senior Cana-
dian official reported that the U.S. Navy had reassigned forty-four destroyers and 
destroyer escorts from EASTLANT (headquartered near London, England) and 
IBERLANT (Lisbon, Portugal) to WESTLANT (Norfolk, Virginia).59 
The fact that the U.S. Navy had dozens of escorts to shuttle among theaters 
underscores the greatest difference between the two navies: although the RCN 
could match its ally in terms of quality, it paled with regard to quantity. The 
U.S. Navy simply had the ability, and willingness, to devote more resources to 
the SSG problem. For example, in the summer of 1956 the U.S. Navy’s Project 
Nobska study emphasized the potential of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) 
for ASW.60 SSNs evolved into arguably the most effective A/S platform; however, 
while the RCN pushed hard to acquire them in the late 1950s, the Canadian 
government considered them beyond its means. In another example, in 1959 
the U.S. Navy formed Task Group (TG) Alfa to evaluate new A/S concepts. Con-
sisting of an A/S carrier, a destroyer squadron, A/S submarines, a shore-based 
MPA squadron, and abundant research support, Alfa rivaled the capability of 
the RCN’s entire Atlantic fleet.61 The resources the U.S. Navy could apply were 
unmatched—and in anti-SSG warfare, numbers mattered.
DENUNCIATION
The Seaward Defence Report received mixed reviews when it was evaluated by se-
nior naval and departmental leadership. Since most of the senior RCN leadership 
had been involved with the study, it is not surprising that the navy gave it close-
to-universal acceptance. The only debate revolved around the recommended 
cancelation of the Vancouver-class frigates, a program for which the navy had 
fought long and hard; however, the argument for more St. Laurents eventually 
won out.62 
From there the plan encountered rough seas. When RCN leaders presented 
the Seaward Defence Report to senior defense officials in the autumn of 1955, they 
asked for an additional twenty-five St. Laurents on top of the fourteen already 
approved, as well as funding for surveys for a sound-surveillance system. The 
Chiefs of Staff Committee and senior defense officials agreed to the cancelation 
of the Vancouvers and endorsed a limited survey plan, but they balked at the 
numbers of additional St. Laurents; in a tortuous five-year process, the govern-
ment ultimately approved only an additional six of the class.63 
And that was as good as it got; other elements of the report’s findings en-
countered heavy criticism from those who had to grant final approval. At an 
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October 1955 Chiefs of Staff meeting, Lieutenant General Charles H. Foulkes 
and Deputy Minister of National Defence Frank R. Miller, the senior military 
and departmental leaders, respectively, questioned the assumptions on which the 
naval staff had based its planning, particularly on the likely course of nuclear war. 
They thought it “improbable” that the Soviets would deploy missile submarines 
to North American waters in advance of any conflict, because of the danger of 
provocation, and they noted the uncertainty within NATO about how a nuclear 
war actually might unfold. They also were dismayed by the lavish recommenda-
tions for additional ships and aircraft, believing the plans were based on numbers 
and not actual need. As Deputy Minister Miller put it, “What was required was 
a force to do the job rather than a specific number of ships,” with the navy using 
“effectiveness as a yardstick rather than numbers when considering the building 
programme”; since the new ships were vastly more capable than the old, should 
the navy not be able to get by with fewer of them?64 
The air force was more critical. The RCAF consistently had questioned the 
need for naval aviation in the Canadian context, so it was not surprising that 
the chief of the air staff, Air Marshal C. Roy Slemon, opposed the navy’s plans.65 
He complained that the RCAF had not been consulted, and insisted that aircraft 
alone could support the sound-surveillance systems, negating any need for ad-
ditional ships. Slemon also noted that, according to his information, the Soviets 
would not possess seagoing nuclear-missile technology for another five years—
which, of course, was precisely the window on which the RCN had focused.66 
These criticisms crippled the navy’s plans, and the final nail in the coffin was 
hammered home a few weeks later when the naval staff sought additional funds 
to fulfill some of the measures recommended by the Seaward Defence Report. The 
members of the powerful departmental finance committee were unmoved by the 
navy’s arguments and rejected a budget increase to cover the cost of additional 
St. Laurents or to fulfill any other measures associated with the plan. Although 
senior defense officials acknowledged that they were taking a risk in the face of 
the SSG threat, the navy’s plan simply was beyond what the government was will-
ing to devote to maritime defense.67 
OPERATIONAL TRIALS
If the acquisition and budgetary aspects of the Seaward Defence Report largely 
went unachieved, its operational concepts proved enduring. In early 1956, NSHQ 
formed the Naval Warfare Study Group to investigate further how the RCN 
would fight a war at sea under the agreed NATO strategy, designated M.C. 48. 
The new group’s core, including Commodore Raymond and Captain Landymore, 
had been influential contributors to the Seaward Defence Committee.68 Fore-
most among the new group’s aims was determining how to defend against the 
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“Principal Threat: Attacks on inland and Coastal targets by submarine-launched 
guided missiles with nuclear warheads.” One decision, obviously based on the 
deliberations of the Seaward Defence Committee, was to divide the seaward-
defense area into three zones: “an inner firing zone (where submarines might fire 
[missiles] upon shore targets, a middle combat zone (where submarines might be 
destroyed), and an outer harassing zone (where submarines could be prevented 
from snorkeling).”69 The distance of the zones from the coast would vary accord-
ing to conditions, but the idea was to force submarines to snorkel well before they 
reached launching positions, to be detected by the sound-surveillance system, 
which would cue offensive forces onto the contact.
The RCN tested these concepts in a series of exercises called BEAVERDAM. 
More than anything, the exercises revealed the near impossibility of destroying 
missile boats before they launched their payloads. BEAVERDAM 3, carried out off 
Nova Scotia in March 1959, provided stark evidence of the challenges confront-
ing A/S forces.
The exercise executed the so-called BEARTRAP plan, which anticipated an 
emergency situation in which missile attacks from submarines were “immi-
nent.” For this scenario, the plan assumed the SSGs had penetrated the sound- 
surveillance net to reach their firing positions, with the objective of reducing 
Allied “retaliation capacity” by attacking SAC bases, with ports and population 
centers secondary targets. “Hostilities are assumed to commence,” the exercise 
orders explained, “with the first firm knowledge that a missile has been launched 
or with the discovery of a fully surfaced submarine in a position from which 
the Primary and Secondary targets could be effectively attacked.” Until those 
conditions prevailed, “submerged or snorting intruders can only be tracked and 
heckled—no live-load weapon attacks could be pressed home by anti-submarine 
forces.”70 By this time it was thought that boats would have to surface for ten 
minutes to launch their missiles, and BEARTRAP called for “the concentration of 
surface and air forces within what are deemed probable missile launching areas, 
in such density as to ensure that a submarine can be observed and attacked with-
in ten minutes of surfacing. This, of course, necessitates some calculated risks 
because of limitations imposed by the forces which are expected to be available. 
Equal intensity coverage could not be planned throughout the entire CANLANT 
area.” For BEAVERDAM III, the exercise was confined to an area amounting to 
one-third of the full CANLANT zone, with participating air and surface assets 
limited by the same proportion. Three submarines formed Orange, while Blue 
comprised the aircraft carrier Bonaventure, nine escorts, three maritime-patrol 
squadrons, and Station Fox.71 
BEAVERDAM III tested counter-SSG tactics in the so-called inner firing zone, 
and the positioning of the Blue forces reflected the Seaward Defence Report’s 
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concept of an immediate offensive response. In line with how it was thought the 
Soviets would mount such an operation, the three Orange submarines, HMS Al-
derney and Ambush and USS Redfin, targeted specific U.S. air bases: Redfin was 
to hit Loring Air Force Base (AFB) in northeast Maine; Ambush was assigned 
Ernest Harmon AFB at Stephenville, Newfoundland; and Alderney targeted 
Argentia Naval Air Station on Newfoundland’s south coast.72 It was thought that 
SSGs would have to approach to within visibility range of a geographic feature 
such as a headland to fix their position to input accurate navigational guidance 
for their missiles; accordingly, Blue surface groups were deployed on either 
“fixing point patrols” off obvious landmarks or “surface force patrols” in high- 
probability launch areas farther out to sea. Blue-force MPAs saturated the same 
areas. Bonaventure, with CS2F Trackers embarked, was positioned to seaward of 
the MPA patrols; the carrier was escorted by only a single plane-guard destroyer, 
since planners assumed an SSG would avoid attacking such a target before hos-
tilities broke out.73 
The main aim of BEAVERDAM III was to determine whether an MPA orbiting 
within ten minutes’ flight time of a surfaced SSG could detect and attack it before 
it launched its missiles. The postexercise analysis declared that “a measure of 
success was achieved”; however, that measure was small indeed. Of the eighteen 
opportunities MPAs had to detect surfaced submarines during the three phases 
of the exercise, two boats were detected within two minutes and killed, another 
was killed during the ten-minute launch window, another kill occurred just after 
launch, and in two instances air patrols prevented boats from surfacing. Thus, 
only three launches definitely were thwarted—which meant that as many as fif-
teen nuclear-armed missiles rocketed toward their targets.74 
The performance of the surface groups was even more dismal. Most ships 
failed to approach within a dozen miles of a submarine, and in the one close 
encounter, although Ambush sighted the new destroyer Restigouche through its 
periscope when passing within 2,800 yards, the ship’s sonar failed to detect the 
SSG. Two summaries give a flavor of the encounters. At 0950 on 12 March:
Alderney surfaced in position 44-44N 59-36W, and at 1000 simulated firing her first 
missile at Argentia. Assessed as a successful missile launch. This launch was made 
22 miles from the center of Area 2, in the close proximity of a fleet of approximately 
30 fishing vessels. The area was being surveyed by Summerside Neptune Y4X04. At 
1025, Alderney surfaced in the same position and at 1035 simulated firing her second 
missile at St. John’s, NFLD. Assessed as a successful missile launch.
At about the same time:
Ambush surfaced in position 43-45N 59-36W, and at 1003 simulated firing her first 
missile at Stephenville. Assessed successful missile launch. This launch was made 7 
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miles from the center of Area 3 which was being surveyed by Bonaventure Tracker 34 
Dressing Room. Ambush dived and surfaced again at 1018 to prepare her second mis-
sile for launch at 1031. She sighted Bonaventure Tracker 34 Dressing Room closing 
90 seconds before scheduled launch time; however, Ambush remained on the surface, 
altered end-on to the aircraft, and simulated firing on schedule, again at Stephenville. 
She dived immediately on firing and was attacked with depth charges 30 seconds 
after submerging. 34 Dressing Room attack assessed possible kill.75 
The exercise analysis found numerous reasons why the SSGs carried out their 
missions virtually unscathed. The notoriously poor ocean environment off Nova 
Scotia hindered the performance of sonar; the dozens of fishing vessels in the 
area clogged radar screens and provided cover for submarines; aircraft failed to 
use ECM; and communication between ships and aircraft was poor or nonexis-
tent. Interestingly, although it was thought that poor weather would hamper not 
only the MPAs but the SSGs as well, the submarines still were able to fix their 
launch positions from features ashore. “Consequently, even though adverse con-
ditions appear to create a stalemate, any reliance upon unfavorable circumstances 
to discourage missile attacks, would be wishful thinking.”76 
The grim results of BEAVERDAM III were mirrored in other exercises in the 
series. This suggested that any optimism about defeating SSGs was itself “wishful 
thinking.”
TO THE FUTURE
Appearing before Congress in 1958, American naval leaders warned of the 
gravity of the SSG threat. Rear Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, Assistant Chief for 
Nuclear Propulsion at the Bureau of Ships, testified as follows:
We know [the Soviets] have operational missiles which are good for at least 200 miles 
and probably more. I would anticipate that in the not too distant future they will 
have operational missiles with a range of up to 600 to 700 miles. Therefore, with a 
large number of submarines that can carry missiles fitted with atomic or hydrogen 
warheads, they have the capacity to operate off our coasts and destroy our cities. . . . 
[This] is the gravest immediate threat that faces the United States.77
The threat was indeed ominous, but a lot of flesh had been put on the bones 
of solutions to the SSG problem since the RCN had produced the Seaward De-
fence Report three years earlier. Intelligence had a firmer grasp of Soviet strategy 
and capability; sound-surveillance systems maintained their abundant promise; 
tactics had matured, through exercises such as BEAVERDAM III; and new and 
evolving countermeasures—such as A/S submarines, the Jezebel passive acoustic 
processor, magnetic anomaly detection, Julie explosive echo ranging, and nuclear 
depth charges—had increased the probability of killing missile boats. Canadian 
maritime forces and the U.S. Navy also arrived at a unified strategy to deal with 
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the SSG problem.78 Against that, the Soviets were ready to deploy their first wave 
of SSGs with more-advanced missiles, and had developed another potentially 
devastating weapon in the nuclear torpedo.79 
Yet despite the relentless march of measure and countermeasure, the basic 
contentions introduced in the Seaward Defence Report remained valid. Any hope 
of intercepting SSGs before they launched their missiles required a reliable, long-
range means of detecting them and the ability to respond quickly and decisively 
to the information.
When the Cold War threatened to explode during the tense weeks of October– 
November 1962’s Cuban missile crisis, Canadian maritime forces used the con-
cepts of the Seaward Defence Report to defend the eastern seaboard of North 
America. MPAs saturated potential submarine launch positions, while surface 
groups were positioned to provide offensive support to the sound-surveillance 
arrays at Shelburne and Argentia; later in the crisis Canadian sea- and airborne 
forces moved south to help defend U.S. assets.80 Although it is unknown whether 
the Soviets deployed SSGs or other boats into the Canadian northwest Atlantic 
during the crisis (current research suggests they did not), if they did so Canadian 
maritime forces, by implementing the concepts of the Seaward Defence Report 
and working seamlessly with their USN allies, were at least well positioned to 
intercept them; whether they could have destroyed them before the critical mo-
ment of missile launch is another question.81 
Nonetheless, using the information at their disposal at the dawn of the SSG 
threat, the authors of the RCN “new look” delivered a sound, innovative defensive 
concept. And that concept proved adaptable and enduring.
The process of formulating a seaward-defense plan in the shadow of an emerging 
nuclear threat, as well as the operational concept at which naval planners arrived, 
has utility beyond the scope of this article. In terms of the planning process, three 
avenues for further analysis present themselves.
First, what does the RCN and USN response to the SSG threat say about the 
two services’ ability to handle dynamic strategic and tactical circumstances? In 
particular, the U.S. Navy has served as a useful model of how such institutions 
deal with change; and, depending on the availability of historic documentation, 
an examination of its organizational response to the ASW challenges confronting 
it in the 1950s could be instructive in this regard.82 
Second, the stark contrast between the resources the two navies could apply 
to the SSG problem would make for useful analysis into how organizations with 
varying levels of fiscal, political, and public support cope with such dynamic 
change. Small- and medium-size navies such as the RCN simply cannot adjust to 
such circumstances in the same way the U.S. Navy can. Given that the U.S. Navy 
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has striven to enhance relationships with allies—to build what one CNO referred 
to as a “thousand-ship navy”—comparative analysis of how such relationships 
might be affected by the inability of other navies to meet change at the same pace 
as their American ally—which could result in a critical “capability gap”—would 
seem germane.83 
Finally, the measures of the seaward defense plan and the application of the 
forces potentially involved invite study in terms of their viability in the face of 
some of the challenges facing today’s naval planners. For instance, since aspects 
of the plan can be applied to the notion of antiaccess warfare, it can be used to 
weigh both defensive and offensive perspectives of the concept.84 
In the end, it is probably best that we do not know whether the seaward de-
fense plan, or any similar plan, would have been successful if tested by actual 
nuclear attack. Nonetheless, studying the plan has value in both the historical 
and contemporary contexts.
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